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BOOK REVIEW
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT by Raoul Berger. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press. Biblio. index. 1977. Pp. x + 483. $15.00 cloth.
Robert A. Ertman*
There is nothing novel in Professor Berger's charge that the Supreme
Court has twisted and ignored the intent of the framers of the Constitution
by exercising an "amending power" under the "guise of interpretation."1
Berger, however, has thoroughly examined primary historical sources and
effectively marshalled the evidence in favor of the theory that the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment intended it to have a very narrow effect. His
style is readable and avoids legalistic jargon. Further, Berger is known for
his consistent rejection of an expansive interpretation of the Constitution
even when he would approve of the result. 2 These qualities give the book a
general air of objectivity which cannot be ignored. 3
Professor Berger correctly distinguishes between the historical question of
what was the framers' intent and the issue of whether the original intention
of the framers is binding on the present generation. 4 The majority of the
book is devoted to historical expositions of the intent of the original framers
of the Constitution and the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
book review will examine the validity of Berger's crucial argument that, ac-
cording to traditional canons of interpretation, the clear intent of the framers
of the Constitution is "as good as written into the text" and that any in-
terpretation contrary to their intent is not valid. 5
Berger argues that interpretation according to the framers' intent is a
"long-standing rule of interpretation in the construction of all documents-
wills, contracts, statutes-and although today such rules are downgraded as
'mechanical' aids, they played a vastly more important role for the Found-
ers."6 He attacks the misuse of Marshall's famous dictum that "[w]e must
* B.A., University of Kansas; J.D., DePaul University.
1. R. BERCER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BERGER].
2. See Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post-Mortem, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 602, 642 (1942).
3. This book is not tainted by racial prejudice. Professor Berger says in his introduction
that "[m]y study may be absolved of that imputation: I regard segregation as a blot on our
society ...." His attempt at self-defense is understandable, but his citation for this statement
reads in full: "One reads with horror of the Negro lynchings and torture that found their way
into the courts as late as 1938. P. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES, 1918-1969, at
95, 123 (1972)." The citation proves nothing; it is an example of Berger's use of citations per se
to support his text. BERGER, supra note 1, at 4 n.12.
4. BERGER, supra note 1, at 8.
5. Id. at 7.
6. Id. at 365.
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never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding . . .a constitution
intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs." 7  Even if Berger is correct, it does not
excuse his failure to discuss the validity of Marshall's distinction. Also there
are obvious fundamental differences between wills, deeds, contracts, and stat-
utes, on the one hand, and the constitution of a nation-state on the other.
Further, the traditional canons for written document interpretation were es-
tablished before the existence of written constitutions; therefore, the applica-
tion of these canons to the United States Constitution is by analogy rather
than by contemporaneous authority. Berger does not acknowledge that the
application is by analogy; thus, at no point is the appropriateness of the
analogy examined.
A more important issue is whether Berger is correct in asserting that the
traditional canons of written document interpretation consist essentially of a
search for the intention of the framer. Although this is the orthodox modern
view,8 it does not follow that this view was predominant when the Constitu-
tion and the Fourteenth Amendment were adopted. Berger cannot prove
this assertion by citing post-Constitution cases to the effect that "[t]he inten-
tion of the lawmaker is the law," 9 nor by citing the eighteenth century En-
glish rule to the same effect. 10
The rule that the lawmaker's intent is the law must be read in light of the
prevailing legal fiction that words possess fixed and unalterable meanings."
This concept was a carry-over from the medieval belief that the inherent
potency of words was "no mere fairy tale, but a reality of life." 12 With the
intellectual development of the Renaissance and Enlightenment the view
lost general currency, but it remained as a legal fiction for reasons peculiar
to the English judicial system. 13
In the early nineteenth century the fixed meaning rule gave way not to
the modern search for subjective intent but to the rule that plain meaning
7. In brief, Berger argues that this portion of McCulloch was merely dicta, that it did not
concern an extention of powers but rather the proper means of carrying out expressly granted
powers. In addition, Marshall, writting under a pseudonym, denied that the opinion claimed
any right to change the Constitution. BERGEn, supra note 1, at 375-77, quoting McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 416 (1819).
8. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407 (1950).
9. BERGER, supra note 1, at 7-8 n.24.
10. Id. at 7-8 n.24, 366.
11. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2461 (3d ed. 1940).
12. Id.
13. Id. For example, there was a prejudice in favor of the legal heirs. This prejudice is not
suprising since land was not devisable until 1540. By refusing to acknowledge the testator's
intention the older system of land inheritance would be promoted. If an heir was not mentioned
in a will, no parol evidence, however convincing and reliable, would be admitted to show that
the omission was intentional. Therefore the heir would receive his share as if there had been no
will. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2461 (3d ed. 1940).
There was also a prejudice against allowing juries to interpret written documents, especially
deeds. The legal fiction that written words had only one meaning protected documents from an
uncertain fate at the hands of jurors. Id.
[Vol. 28:559
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cannot be disturbed. The meaning of words was still fixed by rules of law
unless a contradictory meaning was clear from the face of the document.14
Interpretation of statutes was more complex, since the courts could not
dismiss the will of Parliament. Blackstone stated the rule as follows:
The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legis-
tator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made,
by signs the most natural and probable. And these signs are either the
words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequences, or
the spirit and reason of the law. 15
In other words the will of the lawmaker is to be found in signs or outward
manifestations of intent. This is an explicit rejection of the interpretation of
statutes according to the true, subjective intent of the framers.
Berger states that the legislative history of a statute, including committee
reports, is "commonly regarded as the best evidence of legislative 'inten-
tion.' "16 The merits of this approach are debatable, but it is the prevailing
American practice. Justice Frankfurter once remarked that "only when the
legislative history is doubtful do you go to the statute." 17 The traditional
English rule is just the opposite. Not only is legislative history inadmissible
as evidence, but neither court nor counsel can refer to it.18
Even if the rule that "the will of the lawmaker is the law" is taken at face
value, it does not follow that the intent of the framers is "as good as written
into the Constitution." Members of the Constitutional Convention were not
the lawmakers since they did not accept and ratify the Constitution. This is
equally true for members of the Thirty-ninth Congress who did not accept
and ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. Berger, in addressing the importance
of "original intention," 19 twice quotes Madison as saying that if "the sense in
which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the Nation ...be not
the guide in expounding it, there can be no security for a consistent and
stable [government], more than for a faithful exercise of its powers." 20
14. Id.
15. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 59 (8th ed. 1778).
16. BERGER, supra note 1, at 7. Professor Berger cites H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS 1266 (1958), but ignores the contrary conclusion regarding the traditional rule outlined
on page 1264. See note 22 infra.
17. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 543
(1947).
18. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1264 (1958).
19. BERGEn, supra note 1, at 364.
20. Id. at 3, 364. Berger is quoting from Madison's letter to Henry Lee dated June 25,
1824, on the subject of combatting party spirit, especially that of the ascendant party.
Although Professor Berger does not discuss Madison's argument that the Constitution should
be interpreted according to the intent of the ratifying states, it should be mentioned here.
According to Madison's argument, the States have ultimate authority to interpret the Constitu-
tion and to set aside any act which they think violates it. Madison subsequently took this posi-
tion in the Virginia Resolution. J. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA 239 (1960). This is also the
position taken by the Southern States before the Civil War. See, e.g., VIRGINIA COMMISSION
ON CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, WE THE STATES 275 (1964) (the Fort Hill Address of John
1979]
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Berger appears oblivious to any distinction between the intent of the framers
and the intent of those who ratified the Constitution, and uses Madison's
quotation as support for his proposition that "[e]ffectuation of the draftsman's
intention is a long-standing rule of interpretation in the construction of all
documents-wills, contracts, statutes ...."21 Perhaps his failure to distin-
guish between the nature of various types of documents is responsible for
this error.
The modern reader has access to ample legislative history of the Con-
stitutional Convention, mainly in Madison's copious and generally accurate
notes. 22 However, this material was not available at the time the Constitu-
tion was ratified. For example, the official journal was not published until
1819,23 and Madison's notes were published posthumously in 1840.24 This
unavailability was not inadvertent; it resulted from the secrecy rules adopted
by the Convention. 25  Despite precautions, it was inevitable that the record
C. Calhoun on July 26, 1831). Despite the merit of the position prior to the Civil War, currently
it is not a viable theory of interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
21. BERGER, supra note 1, at 365.
22. See J. JACOBSTEIN & R. MERSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 133-35 (4th ed.
1973).
23. C. VAN DOREN, THE GREAT REHEARSAL 38 (1948).
24. Id. at 39.
25. The following rules were adopted on May 29, 1787:
That no copy be taken of any entry on the journal during the sitting of the House
without the leave of the House.
That members only be permitted to inspect the journal.
That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise published, or com-
municated without leave.
M. FARRAND, 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 15 (rev. ed. 1937).
In explaining the reasons for these rules, Hamilton, in a letter dated September 11, 1792,
under the pseudonym "Amicus," stated:
Had the deliberations been open while going on, the clamors of faction would have
prevented any satisfactory result; had they been afterwards disclosed, much food
would have been afforded to inflammatory declamation. Propositions made without
due reflection, and perhaps abandoned by the proposers themselves on more ma-
ture reflection, would have been handles for a profusion of ill-natured accusation.
Every infallible declaimer, taking his own ideas as the perfect standard, would have
railed without measure or mercy at every member of the Convention who had gone
a single line beyond his standard.
C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 136-37 (1937).
It is worth noting that these secrecy rules were respected until well after the ratification of
the Constitution, even by Convention delegates who opposed adoption and later led the fight
against ratification. C. ROsSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 283 (1966). The purpose and
effect of the rules was clarified in a letter written by Edmund Carrington, a member of Con-
gress from Virginia, to Madison, dated June 13, 1787, stating: "Having matured your opinions
and given them a collective form, they will be fairly presented to the public and stand their
own advocates. ... C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 137 (1937).
This objective was not the author's afterthought because it clearly appears in the record at the
very beginning of the Convention:
Mr. King objected to one of the rules in the Report authorising any member to
call for the yeas & nays and have them entered on the minutes. He urged that as
the acts of the Convention were not to bind the Constituents it was unnecessary to
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would be used by some convention delegates to support their interpretations
of the Constitution. Such use of the record was made in connection with the
ratification of Jay's Treaty in 1796.26 The secrecy and the reaction to its
breach convince this author that the interpretation of the Constitution ac-
cording to the intent of the framers is contrary to the intent of the framers.
This is the legal process: the interpretation of the Constitution in the con-
text of a particular case and controversy. It is this reasoned decision-making
which gives meaning to all law, including the words "life," "liberty," "prop-
erty," and "due process of law," found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Berger argues that these were well developed concepts and "words
of received meaning." 27 This is correct, but only in the sense that it is not
permissible to define them innovatively, without regard for their developed
meanings. While the original source of the words is the Magna Carta,2 8 it is
exhibit this evidence of the votes; and improper as changes of opinion would be
frequent in the course of the business & would fill the minutes with contradictions.
Col. Mason seconded the objection; adding that such a record of the opinions of
members would be an obstacle to a change of them on conviction; and in case of its
being hereafter promulged must furnish handles to the adversaries of the Result of
the Meeting.
The proposed rule was rejected nem. contradicente.
M. FABRAND, 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 10 (rev. ed. 1937)
(Madison's notes of May 28, 1787).
26. The House of Representatives demanded to see the State Department papers relating to
the treaty. President Washington refused to deliver them on the ground that no part of the
treaty-making power was vested in the House. His message to the House on March 30, 1796,
relied not only on the "plain letter of the Constitution itself," but also on his personal under-
standing as a member of the Convention together with the official journal. M. FARRAND, 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 371 (rev. ed. 1937).
On April 6, 1796, in the House of Representatives, Madison rose to protest:
But, after all, whatever veneration might be entertained for the body of men who
formed our Constitution, the sense of that body could never be regarded as the
oracular guide in expounding the Constitution. As the instrument came from them
it was nothing more than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and
validity were breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the
several State Conventions. If we were to look, therefore, for the meaning of the
instrument beyond the face of the instrument, we must look for it, not in the Gen-
eral Convention, which proposed, but in the State Conventions, which accepted
and ratified the Constitution.
Id. at 374. Madison used harsher language in a letter sent to Jefferson two days before address-
ing the House:
According to my memory & that of others, the Journal of the Convention was, by
a vote deposited with the P., to be kept sacred until called for by some competent
authority. How can this be reconciled with the use he has made of it?
Id. at 372.
27. BERGER, supra note 1, at 35.
28. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1137 (1973). The Magna Carta was originally imposed upon
an unwilling King by his rebellious barons who were protecting their own narrow interests. In
later centuries, the meaning of the Magna Carta grew far beyond the intent of the King or
barons. Id. at 1138.
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obvious that the connotation of these words has been greatly expanded since
the framing of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Berger incorrectly
asserts that "[tihey had been crystallized by Blackstone .... "29 The legal
process did not grind to a halt with the publication of Blackstone's Commen-
taries. This growth of the concept of liberty was well known to the fram-
ers. 30 They used words which they knew had grown in meaning, and which
are capable of further growth. This growth occurs in the continuing process
of reasoned decisionmaking by the application of the Constitution to particu-
lar cases and controversies; it is not a "blank check to posterity."' 3
1
29. Id. at 35 n.55.
30. Blackstone wrote that "[t]here is no transaction in the ancient part of our English history
more interesting and important, than the rise and progress, the gradual mutation, and final
establishment of the charters of liberties, emphatically stiled THE GREAT CHARTER and CHAR-
TER OF THE FOREST .... W. BLACKSTONE, TRACrs 283 (3d ed. 1771).
31. BERGER, supra note 1, at 99, citing WARD ELLIOTT, THE RISE OF GUARDIAN DEMOC-
RACY viii (1974).
